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Abstract: We design a novel sequential public goods experiment to study reciprocity, or 
conditional cooperation. In contrast to the standard simultaneous contribution game, our 
sequential design provides direct evidence on how subjects condition their own 
contributions on the contributions of other subjects in the experiment. We develop a 
simple but useful behavioral-type classification procedure and use it to analyze the data 
from this design. Our results inform two fundamental hypotheses: (1) subjects’ types are 
persistent over an experiment; and (2) the types of subjects included in a group affects a 
group’s ability to sustain cooperation. These hypotheses are often assumed in the public 
goods literature, yet neither has been directly supported. We find support for both 
hypotheses. Moreover, we provide a simple summary statistic that, we show, predicts 
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  1Introduction 
Over the last two decades, research in economics and psychology has begun to take 
seriously the idea that individual differences among participants might be important in 
understanding and modeling behavior and dynamics in experimental games. In the 
experimental public goods literature, one focus of attention is the interaction of 
reciprocators, or “conditional cooperators,” with non-cooperators or “free-riders.” One 
reason for this attention is that a group composed of both conditional cooperators and 
free-riders would likely exhibit diminishing aggregate contributions to the public good 
over time, and this is consistent with frequently-replicated behavior in public goods 
experiments.  Another important reason is that these strategies have firm theoretical 
justification: conditional cooperation (henceforth, CC) emerges as a rational behavior 
under many models of social giving that people have posited (see e.g., Rabin (1993), 
Andreoni (1995a), or Palfrey and Prisbey (1997)), while free-riding (henceforth, FR) can 
typically be supported as a Nash equilibrium.  In addition, a number of models designed 
to address the puzzle of how large-scale non-kin based cooperation in humans evolved 
(Boyd & Richerson, in press) suggest that populations will come to equilibrate at a mix of 
free riders and reciprocal types (e.g., Gintis, 2000). 
Ultimately though, two fundamental hypotheses provide the foundation for 
interest in CC and FR behavior in the experimental public goods literature. One is that a 
person who is classified as a conditional cooperator or free-rider will behave that way 
systematically. We denote this as the Persistence of Type (POT) Hypothesis. Note that 
type persistence does not require that a subject’s contributions must remain constant over 
time, but rather that his or her contribution decisions should be well summarized, and 
  2well predicted, by his or her type classification. The POT hypothesis was advanced by 
Ledyard, among others, who conjectured that there are three types of subjects in public 
goods experiments, including free-riders and those that are socially motivated (Ledyard, 
1995, pp. 171-2).  Moreover, personality psychologists and behavior geneticists, whose 
work is predicated on the existence of stable individual differences in traits and 
predispositions, have long endorsed some version of the POT hypothesis (see, e.g., 
Funder, 2001).  
   The second foundational hypothesis is that the number of CC and FR types within 
a given group affects that group’s cooperative outcomes. We call this the Types Affect 
Outcomes (TAO) Hypothesis. Again, this hypothesis is far from new. Andreoni (1995), 
for example, attributes about half of all cooperative decay in public goods experiments to 
the interaction of free-riders and other types of subjects (see also Houser and Kurzban, 
2002). Many other researchers have suggested that a group’s type composition might 
play a role in explaining their results (see, e.g., Andreoni and McGuire (1993),  Keser and 
van Winden (2000), Brandts and Schram (2001), Gunthorsdottir et. al. (2001) and Frey 
and Meier (2003)). 
While they are fundamental, and perhaps largely accepted, neither POT nor TAO 
is well informed by existing evidence from the experimental public goods literature. 
Although there is a large and recent literature that touches on conditional cooperation 
(see the above cited papers, and e.g., Croson (1998), and Kurzban, McCabe, Smith, and 
Wilson (2000)), to the best of our knowledge only Fishbacher, Gachter and Fehr (2001) 
(henceforth, FGF) provides direct laboratory evidence on whether people actually adopt 
  3conditionally cooperative strategies in group environments.
1  We are not aware of any 
evidence on whether conditional cooperation is played consistently within groups even 
within an experimental session.
2 In addition, FGF are only able to speculate about the 
implications of their results for the TAO hypothesis. In this paper we present data from a 
novel public goods experiment that is designed to provide direct evidence on both 
hypotheses POT and TAO.
 3  
Our research builds on FGF (2001). Their design uses a variant of the strategy 
method (Selten, 1967) in an effort to investigate conditionally cooperative play directly. 
In particular, FGF asked each subject to indicate, hypothetically, the amount that he/she 
would contribute to the public good, for each possible mean amount contributed by the 
subject’s group members.
4 Each subject’s responses were plotted to create his or her 
“contribution profile,” and these profiles were visually grouped to create the four distinct 
behavioral types mentioned above.  They found that 50% of their subjects were 
conditional cooperators, one-third free-riders and the remaining either “Hump-Shaped” or 
“Others.” 
In this paper, we aim to design an environment in which we can observe a large 
number of contribution decisions for each subject and, importantly, the way in which 
each subject conditions his or her decisions on information about group members’ 
                                                 
1 Field experiments on charitable giving have found support for conditionally cooperative strategies (see, 
e.g., Frey and Meier, 2003, and List and Lucking-Reiley, 2002) 
2 Camerer and Fehr (2003) cite FGF (2001) and Croson (1998) to support the claim that “about half the 
subjects [in public goods experiments] are conditional cooperators." FGF (2001) argue that existing 
experimental evidence on conditional cooperation, including Croson (1998), is only indirect (fn. 2, p. 398). 
3 Evidence on the existence and dynamics of conditionally cooperative play has been provided within the 
context of two-person games (see, e.g., Clark and Sefton (2001) and McCabe, Rigdon and Smith (2002)).  
See also Heiner (2002) and Congleton and Vanberg (2001) for closely related theory studies. 
4 To make responses payoff-salient, a public goods game was actually played one time.  Subjects were 
randomly placed into groups of four.  Then, three of the four subjects contributed simultaneously any 
amount they wished to the public good, and then the (randomly chosen) fourth was required to contribute 
according to the contributions of the other group members and his or her expressed contribution profile.  
  4decisions. Also, we want to use an alternative, complementary approach to the strategy 
method, and to incorporate group dynamics.  To accomplish these goals we design a 
“sequential” version of the Voluntary Contribution Mechanism, previously described in 
Kurzban and Houser (2002), that proceeds as follows.  
At the beginning of each round of play, participants simultaneously make an 
initial allocation of tokens between their private and group accounts. Subsequently, the 
current aggregate contribution to the group account is revealed to exactly one player, and 
that same player is allowed to change his or her contribution. Play continues with each 
subject in turn told the aggregate contribution and then given a chance to change his or 
her contribution, until the game ends at a randomly chosen point that is unknown to 
participants. Payoffs are determined by the allocation of tokens to the group and private 
accounts at the point when the game ends.  
An advantage of our design is that it allows us to look at reciprocity in a way that 
most other public goods games do not. In particular, we are able to plot a subject’s 
contributions against the average contribution to the group account that she observed 
before making her own contribution. So, for example, conditional cooperators’ 
contributions should cluster around the forty-five degree line on this plot, while a free 
rider’s contribution should be small regardless of the average contribution he or she 
observes.  
  We use our sequential public goods experiment to inform POT and TAO as 
follows. First, the game provides a way to elicit each subject’s (conditional) contribution 
profile, and this can in turn be used to determine each subject’s type. The statistical 
procedure that we introduce to determine a subjects type is novel, simple and, it turns out, 
  5quite useful. Whether the CC or FR types are present is directly informed by application 
of this procedure.
 5 We provide evidence on POT by investigating whether subjects’ 
decision strategies are similar across games played with different counterparts. Then, 
because subjects are typed, each group can itself be typed according to the composition 
of its members. This enables us to shed light on the validity of TAO.  
  Our results are both broadly consistent with and extend FGF (2001), and provide 
support for both POT and TAO. We classify 63% of our subjects as conditional 
cooperators and 20% as free-riders. With respect to POT, there is strong evidence of 
continuity in subjects’ individual behavioral strategies across the many games they play 
with different counterparts. With respect to TAO, our evidence suggests that groups 
primarily composed of cooperative types sustain cooperation better than groups primarily 
composed of free-riders. While this result was expected, we were surprised to find that a 
group’s cooperative dynamics can be remarkably well predicted by a single, easily 
calculated statistic that summarizes the cooperative propensities of its members. 
 
2. Experimental Procedures and Design 
We ran eighty-four participants in three groups of 24 and one group of 12. We found no 
statistically significant difference in behavior between the 12 and 24 subject sessions, and 
data are pooled to obtain the results reported below. Participants were recruited from the 
undergraduate population using the recruitment system in place at the University of 
Arizona’s Economic Science Laboratory as well as through undergraduate classes at the 
University of Arizona. 
                                                 
5 The approach to behavioral type classification that we propose below is a natural extension of the visual 
inspection approach used by FGF (2001). Because our data are collected with greater noise than is present 
when the strategy method is used, the visual inspection approach with our data is not straightforward. 
  6  Participants arrived in the laboratory and were seated at computer terminals that 
are divided by partitions so that it is not possible to see anybody else’s screen. Except for 
the instructions, which were printed on paper, the entire experiment was conducted via 
computer. Once seated, participants were told that they had already earned their show-up 
payment and that their decisions and earnings would be kept confidential. Subsequently, 
the instructions for our sequential voluntary contribution mechanism, which closely 
followed Andreoni (1995) and are reported in Appendix A, were distributed.  
  The instructions informed participants that they would be assigned to a series of 
groups, each consisting of four people, and that the members of these groups would be 
shuffled randomly over an unspecified number of games. Participants were told that they 
would receive an endowment of 50 tokens per game to divide between two exchanges, 
and that tokens in the individual exchange earned one cent per token, while tokens in the 
group exchange earned half of one cent for each player. The marginal per capita return 
was thus 0.5.  
  Each game consisted of all players simultaneously making an initial allocation of 
tokens between the two accounts. After this initial decision, there were a number of 
rounds during which exactly one player in each group was provided the current 
aggregate contribution to the group exchange, and given the opportunity to change his or 
her allocation to the two accounts. Each person in the group was given a similar decision 
until the game ended at a point unknown to the participants. Participants were told that 
each player would have at least one chance to change their contribution decision. It was 
emphasized that payoffs each round would be determined by the final allocation of all 
group members’ tokens to the two exchanges. The composition of the groups, the order 
  7of play within groups, and the length of each game was generated randomly before the 
experiment and kept constant for all three sessions. Game lengths were generated by 
assigning a probability of .05 that the game would end after any given player's 
opportunity to change their allocation.  This process generated the following game 
lengths, measured in terms of the total number of individual contributions (including the 
four initial simultaneous contributions): 20, 11, 27, 36, 36, 38, 8, 21, 35, 12. 
 Previous  research  indicates that there might be significant amounts of confusion 
in understanding instructions in public goods games (see, e.g., Andreoni, 1995, and 
Houser and Kurzban, 2002); consequently participants completed a ten question quiz that 
had to be answered correctly before players could proceed.  Most participants were able 
to complete the quiz quickly and successfully, and the experimenter privately assisted 
those who required additional help. The first game began after everyone had completed 
the quiz correctly, and subsequent games proceeded automatically after all groups had 
reached the end of the preceding game.  
Participants were paid their experimental earnings privately, roughly $20 on 
average, and dismissed when the experiment concluded. Subjects were in the laboratory 
for about 90 minutes on average. 
 
3. Results 
Each experimental session included at least seven games.  Some sessions proceeded 
slightly faster, and included as many as 10 games. Figure 1 describes the average 
contribution to the group exchange by round, where the averages are taken over all of the 
games that subjects played during the course of our experiment.  Note that round 1 in this 
  8figure indicates the amount in the public account after the initial, simultaneous 
contribution by all subjects. Round two shows the average contribution after the first 
subject is given a chance to revise their contribution, round three the average contribution 
after the second subject has a chance to update, and so on. Note also that because 
different games end at different points, the averages are over different numbers of rounds.  
For example, all games included a round one, so its average is over 186 observations, 
while there are only 21 observations to include in the round 35 average because it was 
reached only in game six.  Figure 1 shows the decay in contributions typically found in 
public goods experiments. In particular, average contributions decayed over time from 
60% to about 35% of the subjects’ endowment.  
The averages described by Figure 1 mask substantial heterogeneity in behavior 
between groups. Figure 2 displays the contribution path realized by two groups over 
different 35 round games. One group’s contribution decays from about 150 to zero after 
19 rounds, and remains very small from that point forward. The other group achieved 
perfect cooperation from the fifth through the final round of the game. Although we 
selected highly disparate group dynamics for Figure 2, there is substantial variation 
between groups in their dynamic contribution paths in general. Hypothesis TAO suggests 
that this variation might be systematically related to variation in groups’ “type” 
compositions.  
 
3.1. Player Types 
There is clear variation in decision strategies between subjects in our experiment. Figure 
3 describes the empirical contribution profile (ECP) for three subjects. The horizontal 
  9axis indicates the mean contribution of a subject’s group members that he/she observed 
before making a contribution decision,
6 and the vertical axis indicates the amount of his 
or her own contribution conditional on that information. Note that the these contribution 
profiles, and all of the data underlying contribution profiles that we report and analyze 
throughout this paper, exclude subjects’ initial simultaneous contributions. The reason, of 
course, is that these contributions are made before any information on the contributions 
of others is observed.
7  
The three subjects that we highlight in Figure 3 demonstrate substantial 
differences in their ECPs. The subject marked with solid squares always contributes all of 
his or her endowment to the public good, regardless of others’ contributions. A second 
subject, marked with diamonds, never contributes to the public good. A final subject, 
marked with solid triangles, roughly matches the mean contribution of his or her group 
members. These behaviors exemplify the three contribution strategies that we focus on 
below: cooperators, conditional cooperators and free-riders. 
  Our empirical contribution profiles include more “noise” than the profiles 
reported by Fishbacher, Gachter and Fehr (2001). For example, the subject marked by 
triangles in Figure 3 contributed, on different occasions, 18 and 43 when his or her 
group’s mean contribution was 25. One reason this might occur is that a subject’s 
contribution strategy depends on more than his or her group’s current contribution. A 
contribution strategy could depend on previous own contributions, or on the path by 
which others’ current mean contribution had been achieved. An alternative explanation 
                                                 
6 Throughout this paper, the mean contribution of a subject’s group members is always net of his or her 
own contribution. 
7 The initial, simultaneous contribution is also different from the other contributions in that subjects were 
told that they would have at least one opportunity to change it. 
  10for this variation is that the contribution strategy is played with error.  In this paper we 
propose a type classification procedure, described below, that is based on a simple 
behavioral framework that models a subject’s contribution decision as a stochastic 
function of the mean contribution of his or her group counterparts. 
 
3.1.a. A Fast and Reliable Type Classification Procedure 
Our approach to behavioral type classification is to pre-specify a set of behaviors of 
interest, and then assign one from this set to each subject. This sort of approach is used, 
for example, by El-Gamal and Grether (1995) in their well-known behavioral typing 
algorithm (see also Houser and Winter, 2002). The behaviors that interest us are 
contributing little most of the time (free-riding), contributing a great deal most of the time 
(cooperating), and contributing an amount roughly equal to the contributions of others 
(conditional cooperation). These are the strategies most often studied in the experimental 
public goods literature, and we do not view our decision to focus on them here as 
controversial.
8 Our procedure is to use a subject’s linear conditional-contribution profile 
to classify them as one of these types. 
We define each subject’s linear conditional-contribution profile (LCP) as the 
outcome of an ordinary least squares regression of his or her contribution decisions on the 
mean  contribution that he/she observed immediately prior to making a contribution 
decision. Formally, let   denote the contribution of subject n when he/she observed 
mean contribution 
() nj yx
. j x  We estimate with ordinary least squares the model  
                                                 
8 Alternative approaches to type classification that allow for the nature of types to be determined 
endogenously are available (e.g., Houser, Keane and McCabe, 2002), but unlike the approach we adopt 
here, these are not necessarily fast or easy. 
  1101 () nj n n j n j yx x β βε = ++          (1) 
 for each subject   where we assume  , n nj ε  is independently and identically distributed 
across   for each   and is allowed to have different variances across subjects.   j , n
An important advantage of equation (1) is that it allows us to summarize each 
subject’s contribution strategy with two parameters: the intercept and slope of his or her 
LCP. The intercept provides a measure of how willing a subject is to cooperate even 
when his or her group counterparts contribute little to the public good. The slope 
measures a subject’s responsiveness, both in direction and magnitude, to other’s 
contributions.  We classify each subject according to their estimated LCP, as follows. 
Consider first a subject who contributes little to the public good, regardless of 
others’ contributions. A strong free-rider, who always contributes nothing to the public 
good, is such a type.  More generally, we classify a subject as a free-rider if their LCP 
implies contributions of less than 50% of his or her endowment regardless of the mean 
contribution of others. Because our subjects are endowed with 50 tokens per period, this 
means a subject is classified as a free-rider if and only if the graph of his or her LCP lies 
everywhere below 25. Similarly, a subject will be classified as a “cooperative” type if and 
only if the graph of their LCP lies everywhere at or above 25. The decision to use 50% of 
the endowment as the distinguishing point is obviously arbitrary, and different cut-off 
points might lead to somewhat different classifications. We will see below that the 50% 
point leads to reasonable results, in that the average behavior of subjects classified as 
free-riders and cooperators conforms well to the behavior researchers likely expect these 
types of subjects to exhibit. 
  12Consider next the “conditionally cooperative” type. This type of subject should 
tend to contribute about the amount that their group counterparts contribute. In this sense, 
the 45-degree line reflects ideal conditional cooperation. More generally, we classify a 
subject as a conditionally cooperative type if the graph of his or her LCP has a positive 
slope and lies both above and below the 50% line.  
LCPs with negative slopes that lay both above and below the 50% line form the 
“residual” group not included in one of the three types we model. Such a player would 
tend to contribute a lot when others contribute little, and little when others contribute a 
lot. To the best of our knowledge, this strategy has received no attention in the public 
goods literature, and indeed we find that such LCPs are infrequent in our sample. Based 
on their decisions in the first seven games, our classification procedure assigns 17 of 84 
subjects (20%) to the free-rider type, 11 of 84 (13%) to cooperator, 53 of 84 (63%) to 
conditional cooperator, and places just 3 subjects (4%)  in the residual group. Note that 
these frequencies correspond reasonably well to those reported by FGF (2001), and this 
lends support to using the strategy method approach in this environment.
9 
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that our goal with the typing procedure is not to 
find the model that best fits, in some sense, the contribution decisions of our subjects. 
Rather, it is to provide a fast and accurate method for inferences about behavioral types, 
after which any analysis of interest may be conducted.  
 
3.1.b. Contribution Profiles by Type 
                                                 
9 See also Burlando and Guala (2002) for an investigation of the accuracy of the strategy method within the 
FGF (2001) environment.  
  13Our type classification results are based on data from the seven games that all subjects 
were able to complete. We treat available additional games as a holdout sample, as 
discussed below.
10  
Figures 4, 5 and 6 describe the contribution profiles for our three types of 
subjects. Each of these figures contains the same five pieces of information, the first three 
of which are: 1) a solid 45-degree line; 2) solid circles that describe how a type’s mean 
contribution to the public good (rounded to the nearest integer) varies with the observed 
contribution of others; and 3) a vertical bar that extends two standard errors above and 
below each mean (when there are multiple observations). 
Fourthly, the translucent squares describe the fit of a Tobit regression model 
given by equation (1), which is estimated by pooling the (non-rounded) data from all 
subjects of a given type, and under the constraints that individual contributions can be 
neither above 100% nor below 0% of the endowment. This is a parsimonious non-linear 
procedure to compare and contrast the contribution decisions of different behavioral 
types. (In the Figures’ “A” panels the model is fit using the first seven games’ data, while 
in the “B” panels it is based on the holdout sample.) The spacing of the squares, located 
wherever there is at least one data point, is the last piece of information, and provides an 
impression of the underlying sample that was used to estimate the model. Comparing the 
patterns in Figures 4A and 5A, for example, reveals that the distribution of the observed 
                                                 
10 When comparing holdout sample behavior against a baseline, it is critical that the baseline be well 
estimated. This is the reason that we use a relatively large part of our sample, seven games, to establish 
baseline behavioral type characterizations. In some studies, particularly research with large field panel data 
sets, it is possible to use half of the observations (or more) as a holdout sample, because the baseline can be 
precisely estimated regardless. The limited amount of data available from our laboratory experiment 
precludes this possibility.  
  14contributions of others includes more weight at lower contribution levels for free-riders 
than for cooperators.  
Figure 4A describes the mean decisions of the 17 subjects that were classified as 
free-riders.  It is clear from visual inspection that free-riders tend to contribute less than 
their counterparts’ average at nearly all contribution levels. The difference is of course 
small and statistically insignificant when their counterparts contribute very little, because 
contributions are bounded below by zero. Figure 5A provides analogous information for 
the cooperator type. The cooperator contribution profile tends to imply contribution 
amounts that are greater than their counterpart’s mean contributions.  
  Visual inspection of Figure 6A suggests that, as a first pass, the simple heuristic 
“contribute what others on average contribute” seems to characterize conditional 
cooperator contribution decisions quite well. It is worthwhile to emphasize that this 
heuristic is not implied by our classification approach. Recall that to be typed as a 
conditional cooperator requires only that a subject’s contribution profile be upward 
sloping, below 25 at zero and above 25 at 50. Hence, for example, a subject with a 
relatively flat profile, ranging from 20 at zero to 30 at 50, would be classified as a 
conditional cooperator.  
  With respect to the fit of the Tobit regression, visual inspection indicates that the 
model fits the major features of the data well in all cases, and seems to differ 
substantially across behavioral types. Indeed, statistical tests reveal that these differences 
are statistically significant.
11  However, because these tests are based on the data used to 
                                                 
11 Recall that we estimate a Tobit model for a particular type by pooling the data for all subjects of that 
type, and then estimating (1) under the restriction that contributions are bounded. Our interest is in testing 
whether the resulting intercept and slope estimates are jointly statistically significantly different between 
behavioral types. We ran these tests pairwise, which generate under the null hypothesis a statistic that is 
  15create the types, they are also biased in favor of finding evidence of differences. 
Appropriate statistical tests based our holdout sample data are reported below. 
  Tables 2 and 3 provide information about the distribution of earnings and final 
contributions, respectively, for each of the three types over the seven games that were 
played by all subjects.  
 
3.2. Evidence on POT and TAO Hypotheses 
 
3.2.a. Evidence on the Persistence of Type Hypothesis 
The persistence of type hypothesis is that there is temporal continuity to the behavioral 
strategies people adopt, at least within an experimental session. To test this hypothesis, 
consider first free-riders. Of the 17 subjects classified as free-riders based on their play in 
the first seven games, 12 are observed in holdout sample games. Figure 4B, which is 
analogous in information content to Figure 4A, describes the contribution profile of the 
12 subjects in these holdout games. It is apparent that, on average, these 12 subjects 
continued to contribute less than their group members during the final games that they 
played. However, in visual comparison with Figure 4A, contributions seem relatively 
higher.  This visual impression is confirmed by comparing the results of the Tobit 
analysis on the in and out of sample data. Table 1 shows that free-riders are estimated to 
increase their contribution by about 23 cents for every dollar contributed, on average, by 
                                                                                                                                                 
asymptotically distributed according to an F(2,n) distribution, where n is the degrees of freedom for the 
test. The possibility of individual-specific effects in the data means the number of degrees of freedom 
available for our tests is likely less than the number of observations in our data set (over three thousand). A 
conservative number of degrees of freedom to use is 28. This is the smallest number of distinct subjects 
included in any pairwise comparison (11 cooperators and 17 free-riders.) Hence, we use an F(2,28) as a 
conservative sampling distribution of our test statistics under the null hypothesis. The values of these 
statistics are 107 (CO = CC), 246 (FR = CC) and 349 (FR = CO), all of which are highly significant 
(P<0.001).  
  16their group counterparts during the first seven games. Table 1 also shows that this 
estimate increases to 0.87 in the holdout sample, and the difference between the estimates 
is statistically significant (P-value<0.001). Hence, while the free-rider type tends to 
contribute less than their counterparts’ mean both in and out of sample, it seems that free-
riders contribute somewhat more in the holdout sample than their behavior during the 
first seven games might have led one to predict.  
  Figures 5B and 6B, and the second and third columns of Table 1, report the 
results of similar analyses for cooperators and conditional cooperators, respectively. The 
results for the 11 cooperators that we observed out of sample are analogous to what we 
found for free-riders: they continued to contribute generally more than their counterparts, 
but statistically significantly differently than they did in the first seven games. However, 
the 35 conditional cooperators observed in the holdout sample made statistically and 
visually identical decisions to those that they made in the first seven games.
12  
  We take two main points from this data. First, while a strong from of the POT 
hypothesis is not supported, there is certainly evidence of continuity in subjects’ decision 
making strategies. In particular, although there are statistical differences in behavior 
between the first seven games and the holdout sample by the FR and CO types, it is 
nevertheless true that each type’s holdout sample is more similar to its own in-sample 
data than to that of any other type.
13 Also, differences in decisions between types are in 
                                                 
12 Specifically, we tested the null hypothesis that the coefficient estimates based on the first seven games 
were identical to the estimates obtained from the data from the holdout sample. The test statistic is 
asymptotically distributed F(2,n) where n is the number of degrees of  freedom. A conservative value of N 
to use is 12, which is the smallest number of distinct subjects in any sample comparison. The test statistics’ 
values are 15.7 (P<0.001), 5.7 (P=0.02), and 0.2 (P=0.82) , for free-riders, cooperators and conditional 
cooperators, respectively.  
13 We ran the test described in footnote 10 using the holdout sample data, and obtained test statistics values 
of 11 (CO=CC), 25 (FR=CC) and 40 (FR=CO) which are significant at the 1% level for any n>5.   
 
  17the expected direction, in that free-riders continue to contribute less than their 
counterparts on average, while cooperators tend to continue to contribute more.  
  Second, conditional cooperation seems to be an extremely stable strategy, and 
both FR and CO decisions move in the direction of conditional cooperation, on average, 
in the holdout sample. This suggests that even the strong types are somewhat facultative, 
changing their behavior as they gather information about the environment. We find this 
result comforting. In particular, from an evolutionary standpoint, it would be unusual to 
find utter inflexibility in an aspect of behavior as important as cooperation. 
 
3.2.b. Evidence on the Types Affect Outcomes Hypothesis 
The TAO hypothesis is that groups composed of more cooperative types tend to achieve 
more cooperative outcomes. Because subjects are assigned types, groups are 
distinguished by their type compositions. We assign a score to each group according to 
the number of each type that it includes. In particular, we assign a score of zero to each 
free-rider in a group, and scores of one and two to each conditional cooperator and 
cooperator, respectively. A group’s score is then the sum of the scores of its members. 
Each of our groups contains four members, so that scores can range between a possible 
low of zero (all free-riders) to a high of eight (all cooperators), with higher scores 
suggesting greater cooperativeness. 
  We obtain group scores ranging from one to seven, because the random matching 
process did not generate any group that included only cooperators or only free-riders. The 
composition of groups with scores of one and seven can be easily deduced from the 
scoring procedure. Groups with other scores have multiple possible compositions. For 
  18example, a score of three can occur if there are three conditional cooperators and a free-
rider, or if there is one cooperator, one conditional cooperator, and two free-riders. It 
turns out that in this particular experiment, 33 of 36 groups assigned a score of three were 
of the former type.
14  
The TAO hypothesis is informed by investigating how a group’s score is related 
to its propensity to sustain cooperation. One reasonable measure of whether cooperation 
is sustained is the final amount contributed by a group to the public good, and over the 
first seven games we find that there is a positive relationship between this measure and 
our readily calculated group score.
15 Moreover, a regression analysis reveals that this 
relationship is statistically significant, and implies that a one point increase in the group 
cooperativeness score is associated with about a 20 token increase in the amount of the 
final contribution to the public good.
16 A similar analysis run on the groups observed in 
the holdout sample reveals a nearly identical relationship, and one cannot reject the 
hypothesis that the group score has the same effect on final group contributions both in 
and out of sample.
17 
                                                 
14 A detailed listing of the compositions we obtained in this experiment are available from the authors on 
request. 
15 As pointed out in section 2, the games lasted different numbers of rounds (between 8 and 36). Clearly, 
game length will also contribute to the amount of cooperative decay that a group experiences. When the 
number of observations on a particular group score is large, the game length effect is mitigated by the 
randomization procedures embedded in our design. For some group scores we have a quite small number of 
observations (see Figure 8). In these cases, the game length effect will tend to obscure the relationship 
between the group’s cooperativeness score and the final group contribution, and therefore will tend to make 
it more difficult for this simple analysis to provide support for the TAO hypothesis. In this light, we find it 
remarkable that TAO is so strongly supported by our results. 
16 We ran a regression of the final contribution amount on an intercept and the group cooperativeness score. 
The coefficients’ point estimates are 11 and 21, respectively,  with only the 21 statistically significant (P-
value < 0.001). 
17 The same regression run on the holdout data generated coefficient estimates of 10 and 25, respectively, 
with only 25 statistically significant (P-value < 0.01). The null hypothesis that the intercept and slope 
parameters are jointly identical for the first seven games and holdout sample cannot be rejected at standard 
significance levels (P-value = 0.59). 
  19Figure 7 details the ability of our simple group score to predict a group’s final 
public contribution. This figure provides the mean final group contribution (over the first 
seven games) for each group score, and a two standard error interval above and below 
that mean. It also plots the realized final group contribution for those groups observed in 
the holdout sample. The absolute difference between the in-sample means and the 
holdout sample means are close, with the greatest deviation being about 26 tokens (when 
the cooperativeness score is six.) Moreover, the holdout sample means are generally 
within, or nearly within, two standard errors of the in-sample means. Of course not all of 
these standard errors are tight, because, as indicated in the figure, the number of 
observations for some group scores is quite small (e.g., two and three observations during 
the first seven games on groups with scores of seven and one, respectively.) Nevertheless, 
this evidence suggests that our simple cooperativeness score predicts final group 
contributions well. 
  Figures 8A through 8D provide additional detail on the cooperative dynamics of 
in-sample and out-of-sample groups in our sessions. On these figures, the horizontal axis 
indicates the round, and the vertical axis the equally-weighted (over groups) mean 
contribution to the public good. We include only groups with cooperativeness scores 
between two and five, because the number of observations on groups with other scores is 
too low (either one or two) to allow reasonable inferences with respect to dynamics.   
The pattern of mean contributions over rounds in the first seven games is a non-
parametric prediction of cooperative dynamics in the holdout games. The vertical bars 
extend two standard errors above and below each in-sample mean.  It is visually evident 
that the cooperative dynamics in our holdout sample are strikingly well predicted by in-
  20sample behavior. In particular, for groups with scores of 2, 4 and 5, nearly all of the 
holdout sample’s mean contributions are within two standard errors of the predicted 
means. The fit is least strong for groups with scores equal to three, but even in this case 
visual inspection suggests that the predictions are “good,” and still over half of all 
holdout means are within a two-standard error band of the predicted value. This is further 
evidence in support of the TAO hypothesis, and that our naïve group scoring procedure, 
which is clouded by game length effects and the fact that multiple compositions are 
possible for a single score, is reasonably able to predict outcomes.  
  These findings have implications for the POT hypothesis. The fact that we find 
within session consistency in behavior is comforting, but POT will be more valuable to 
the extent that there is between-session consistency. Future behavioral type-classification 
research might profitably be directed towards investigations where subjects participate in 
the same experiment over a period of days or weeks to assess consistency over more 
substantial periods of time. Research investigating “social value orientation” is 
encouraging in this respect (e.g., Van Lange & Semin Goossens, 1998). Moreover, it 
would be useful to obtain evidence of type-persistence between games. The type 
construct would be strengthened by finding that, for example, CC players in our 
sequential public goods game tend to be tit-for-tat players in a prisoners’ dilemma game.  
 
4. Conclusion 
Conditional cooperation, or reciprocity, is the focus of considerable theoretical and 
empirical attention, and rests on two hypotheses, which we labeled “Persistence of Type” 
and “Types Affect Outcomes,” both of which are in need of direct empirical 
  21investigation. The novel sequential public goods game described in this paper provides a 
new opportunity to observe players’ contribution decisions conditional on information 
about others’ current contributions, and provides a clean way to test the two fundamental 
hypotheses. 
  The Persistence of Type hypothesis is that an individual’s behavioral “type” well 
characterizes his or her decisions within an experimental session (at least). We developed 
a simple and reliable type classification algorithm and used it to assign types to our 
subjects. Over half of our subjects were classified as conditional cooperators based on 
their behavior early in the experiment. Many of those same subjects were observed in a 
holdout sample, and we found their decision strategy in the holdout sample to be 
statistically identical to the strategy they used earlier in the experiment. Similarly, 
subjects who were classified as free-riders (cooperators) and observed in the holdout 
sample tended to contribute less (more) than their group counterparts in both cases. 
The existence of discernable types resonates with models of the evolution of 
cooperation. Though there is not complete consensus in this area, some models suggest 
that populations can stabilize at equilibria in which there is heterogeneity in terms of 
altruistic tendencies, either because agents play mixed strategies, or because there are 
different kinds of agents (see, e.g., Gintis, 2000, Maynard Smith, 1982). It is plausible 
that clarifying the frequency of different types in the population can help to inform these 
models.  
The second hypothesis is that “Types Affect Outcomes,” or that a group’s 
cooperative dynamic is affected by its type composition. We found support for this, in 
that groups that contained more cooperative types tended to cooperate more. We then 
  22suggested a simple score statistic to summarize a group’s type composition. We found 
that this score was statistically significantly correlated with a group’s ability to sustain 
cooperation, and moreover, that a group’s score statistic is a reliable predictor of the 
quantitative extent to which a group will sustain cooperation in our environment.  
Note that the ability to predict contributions in a VCM experiment is not 
necessarily surprising. It is regularly found, for example, that subjects in a standard linear 
VCM (strangers condition) contribute about half of their endowment, on average, and 
after 10 rounds decay to around 10% of their endowment. We do find it surprising, 
however, that our simple group score statistic, based on our simple individual type-
classification algorithm, has a remarkable ability both to separate and to predict group 
cooperative dynamics.  
In the concluding section of their stimulating article, Fishbacher, Gachter and 
Fehr (2001) begin to speculate tentatively on the implications of their results (based on a 
one shot game) for group cooperative dynamics. Having found evidence of both free-
riding and conditionally cooperative strategies, they point out that groups that include 
both types might be expected to experience cooperative decay and convergence to a non-
cooperative equilibrium.  They go on to speculate that, “The speed of convergence 
depends on the actual composition of the group.” (Section 4, p. 403). The results of this 
paper provide the first direct evidence in support of these and other closely related 
hypotheses that have been previously advanced only speculatively in the public goods 
literature. More broadly, because the theoretical efficiency of an institution usually relies 
on some form of behavioral continuity, evidence that individuals’ behavioral rules exhibit 
temporal stability is valuable to any interested in the design of new mechanisms.  
  23Appendix A. Transcript of Subjects’ Instructions 
 
1  Welcome.  Instructions and messages will appear in this part of the screen.   Since we 
have now begun, please keep your attention on your own computer screen and stay silent 
throughout this experiment unless otherwise instructed.   To go to the next instruction 
screen click on the 'forward' button below.  
 
 2  This experiment is a study of group and individual investment behavior.  Reading and 
following these instructions carefully will help you to make good investment decisions 
and, possibly, to earn a considerable amount of money.  All of your earnings will be paid 
to you privately, in cash, at the end of the experiment.  A research foundation has 
provided the funds for this study.  
 
 3 You will be in a group consisting of four players.  The other players in your group will 
be people sitting in this room.   
 
 4  Each player in your group will be given a certain number of tokens to invest.  You 
will choose to divide your tokens between two investment opportunities: The Individual 
Exchange and the Group Exchange.  Any tokens invested into these exchanges will be 
turned into cash, as described below, and paid to you at the end of the experiment.  Any 
tokens that are not invested have zero value at the end of the experiment. 
 
 5  THE INDIVIDUAL EXCHANGE    Every token you invest in the Individual 
Exchange will earn you a return of one cent at the end of the experiment. (Examples are 
given to the right)  
 
Example: Suppose you invested 28 tokens in the Individual Exchange.  Then you would 
earn $0.28 from this exchange.    Example: Suppose you invested 42 tokens in the 
Individual Exchange.  Then you would earn $0.42 from this exchange.    Example: 
Suppose you invested 0 tokens in the Individual Exchange.  Then you would earn nothing 
from this exchange.  
 
 6  THE GROUP EXCHANGE   Investments in the Group Exchange benefit everybody 
in your group.  Every token you invest in the group exchange returns 0.5 cents to every 
member of your group including yourself.  Therefore, the total amount you earn from the 
Group Exchange depends on the total number of tokens that you and the other three 
members of your group invest in the Group Exchange.  The more the group invests in the 
Group Exchange, the more it returns to each member of the group.  The process is best 
explained by a number of examples, again given to the right.  
 
EXAMPLE: Suppose that you decided to invest no tokens in the Group Exchange, but 
that the three other members invested a total of 50 tokens.  Then your earnings from the 
Group Exchange would be $0.25.  Everyone else in your group would also earn $0.25  _ 
 
  24EXAMPLE: Suppose that you decided to invest 20 tokens in the Group Exchange, and 
the three other members invested a total of 40 tokens.  This makes a total of 60 tokens.  
Then your earnings from the Group Exchange would be $0.30.  Everyone else in your 
group would also earn $0.30   EXAMPLE: Suppose that you decided to invest 30 tokens 
in the Group Exchange, but that the three other members invest nothing.  Then you, and 
everyone else in the group, would get a return from the Group Exchange of $0.15.  
 
 7  THE GROUP EXCHANGE (continued) Every token invested in the Group Exchange 
will earn one half of a cent for every member of the group including the person who 
made the investment.  It does not matter who invests in the group exchange.  Everyone 
will get a return from every token invested whether they invested in the group exchange 
or not.  The table below has been provided for your reference during the experiment. The 
table lists what your payoff would be from the Group Exchange given the number of 
tokens in the exchange.   
 
 8  THE INVESTMENT DECISION    Your task is to decide how many of your tokens to 
invest in the Group Exchange.  You are free to put some tokens into the Individual 
Exchange and some into the Group Exchange.  Alternatively, you can put all of them into 
the Individual Exchange or all of them into the Group Exchange.  
 
 9  STAGES OF INVESTMENT  The game begins with each member making an initial 
investment into the Group Exchange.  After each initial investment has been made the 
game proceeds by giving each person in your group the opportunity, in turn, to change 
their investment decision.  When it is your turn to change your investment decision you 
will be told the average amount that each other player in your group has contributed to 
the group exchange.  The opportunity to change the amount invested in the group 
exchange continues to pass from person to person in your group until at some randomly 
determined point the game ends and payoffs are made.  You will have at least one 
opportunity to change your investment in the group account before the game ends, and 
you may have several.  Your earnings are determined by the amount you have invested in 
the Group and Private Exchanges at the point when the game ends. 
 
10  Remember that your earnings when the game ends are the sum of the returns from the 
tokens you placed in your Individual Exchange plus the return from the total number of 
tokens placed in the Group Exchange.  
 
11  You will play this game several times.  The members of your group will change from 
game to game.  The point at which the game ends will also change from game to game. 
 
12  At the beginning of each game you are given an Endowment of 50 tokens.  You are to 
indicate by filling in the blank below your investment in each account.  You simply enter 
the number of tokens you want to place in the Group Exchange.  The number of tokens in 
the Individual Exchange will automatically be entered so that the sum of your 
investments equals your endowment, 50 tokens. The other players in your group will also 
have 50 tokens to invest. You must make your investment decisions without knowing 
  25what the other players in your group are investing. When you have made your investment 
decisions you will click on the red ‘submit’ button.  
 
 13  When the game ends you will be told the total number of tokens currently invested in 
the Group Exchange as well as your earnings from the game. 
 
 14  You have now completed the instructions.  If you have any questions, raise your 
hand and ask the experimenter.   Otherwise, click on the large green ‘start’ button.  _ 
 When you do so, you will exit the instructions.  Please be sure that you have understood 




Please choose an initial investment amount for the Group Exchange.  When you are done 
click on the red ‘submit’ button. 
 
BETWEEN ROUNDS, THE INSTRUCTIONS WERE: 
  
It is now your turn to change your investment to the Group Exchange if you would like to 
do so.  When you are done making your changes, if any, click on the red 'submit' button.  
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Table 1




Mean Net Group Contribution 
First Seven Games  0.22 1.15 0.69
Standard Error 0.07 0.04 0.21
Mean Net Group Contribution 
Holdout Sample 0.83 1.21 2.18
Standard Error 0.12 0.09 0.43
First Seven Games Dummy -4.33 -1.45 46.73
Standard Error 1.86 1.24 6.48
Holdout Dummy -11.09 -3.05 -2.51
Standard Error 3.49 2.48 13.09
Table 2
Earnings Distributions by Type over First Seven Games
Distribution of Earnings per Game
Type  mean SD median min max
76.45 18.10 77.5 45 125
70.44 24.18 72.5 25 110





Distribution of Final Contribution by Type over First Seven Games
Contribution
Type  mean SD median min max
FR 7.34 10.75 1 0 50
CO 36.68 19.20 50 0 50
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Contribution Profile of Conditional 
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Group Cooperativeness and Mean Final Group Contribution


































































































































































































First seven games Hold-out sample
Figure 8C. 













































First seven games Hold-out sample
 
Figure 8D. 
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